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One of the most discussed issues of the day is the high cost 
of workers' compensation insurance. As of September 1, 
1982, in the 45 states (including the District of Columbia) 
with private insurers, workers' compensation standard earn 
ed premiums (a term to be defined later) averaged about 
$2.41 per $100 of payroll. The variation among states was 
great, however, ranging from $.74 in Indiana to $4.83 in 
Hawaii. 1 Comparable data are not available for the six states 
with exclusive state funds (Ohio, Nevada, North Dakota, 
Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming). Because this 
session is directed mainly toward regional experience in Con 
necticut, New Jersey, and New York, the relative cost in 
those three states is of special interest. Connecticut ranked 
16th highest with a $2.75 rate, New Jersey 22nd with a $2.48 
rate, and New York 39th with a $1.55 rate.
Many factors account for the variation in these rates, in 
cluding differences in the following: (1) the mix of payrolls 
according to industry and firm size; (2) injury and disease
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frequency and severity rates; (3) statutory benefits including 
eligibility requirements; (4) administrative and court inter 
pretations of these benefits; (5) medical expenses for the 
same treatment; (6) the effectiveness of loss control and 
claims handling services provided by employers, insurers, 
and state agencies; (7) insurer expense and profit loadings; 
and (8) the presence or absence of a competitive state fund.
This paper will concentrate on how the ways in which 
workers' compensation insurance rates are determined and 
regulated vary among the states, with special attention to 
Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York.
Workers9 Compensation 
Insurance Rate Determination
Insured employers can be classified according to whether 
they are (1) class-rated, (2) experience rated, (3) schedule- 
rated, or (4) retrospectively-rated. This section will discuss 
first how insurers determine the insured's premium, given a 
set of rates and rating plans. Second, it will describe in 
general terms how insurers determine the class rates printed 
in their rating manuals. In addition to these rating methods 
many insurers return a dividend that reduces the net cost. 
The dividend may vary among firms depending upon their 
size and individual loss experience. Because these methods 
tend to be the same in all jurisdictions, no special attention 
will be paid to regional practices in this section.
Class Premiums
Employers who are class-rated pay a rate per $100 of 
payroll that is based primarily on the industry or industries 
in which they are engaged. Separate rates have been 
developed for over 600 industries. However, the payroll 
assigned to certain employees such as clerical office 
employees, drivers (usually but not always), and outside
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salespersons is assigned the same rate regardless of the 
employer's industry. For example, suppose a small abrasive 
paper manufacturer has a total payroll of $250,000-$200,000 
for plant workers and $50,000 for clerical office employees. 
Further assume that the class rates per $100 of payroll are 
$2.50 for the plant workers and $.25 for the clerical 
employees. The class premium would be 
2,000($2.50)-f 500($.25) or $5,125. 2 Traditionally all 
workers' compensation insurers in the state charged the same 
class rates, but in an increasing number of states some price 
competition exists with respect to class rates.
For employers whose average class premium is under 
$2,500 (still $750 in some states), the class premium is the 
amount charged. Over half the insured employers are class- 
rated, but because they employ few workers, these class- 
rated firms pay less than 10 percent of the premiums received 
by insurers. All other employers are experience rated. An in 
creasing number are both experience rated and schedule- 
rated. Employers whose premiums exceed $5,000 may be 
permitted to be retrospectively-rated in addition to being ex 
perience rated. Insurers, however, usually limit retrospective 
rating to firms paying premiums of at least $100,000. 
Employers whose experience premiums exceed $5,000 (still 
$1,000 in some states) receive a premium discount because 
the insurer's expenses (not loss payments) do not increase 
proportionately with the premium size. Retrospectively- 
rated employers receive this discount through the retrospec 
tive rating formula. Other eligibile employers are rated under 
a separate premium discount plan.
Experience Rating
Under experience rating an employer's class premium is 
modified to reflect two factors. 3 The first factor is how the 
employer's loss experience during a recent three-year period
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compares with the amount the insurer would have expected 
to pay (given current rates except for changes in the workers' 
compensation law since the experience period) if the 
employer had been an average employer in the same industry 
with the same payroll. For example, if the employer's losses 
were half the insurer's expectation, this factor alone would 
suggest cutting the rate in half. If the losses were twice the in 
surer's expectation, this comparison would suggest a dou 
bling of the rate. However, the adjustment also depends on 
how much credibility or confidence the insurer should assign 
to this employer's loss experience. The reasoning behind this 
factor is that chance alone may cause the experience of in 
dividual employers to fluctuate greatly from year to year. 
The smaller the payroll exposure for a given hazard class, the 
more important this chance factor becomes. For example, a 
very small employer may have no losses for 10 years follow 
ed by a substantial loss the next year. As the employer's 
payroll increases, his or her experience becomes more pre 
dictable because the future tends to resemble the past more 
and more closely. Of course, no matter how large the 
employer may be, the future may differ from the past 
because of such factors as law amendments, inflation, or 
changes in the work environment. In practice, insurers assign 
no credibility to the experience of employers with average 
class premiums of less than $2,500. Above that point the 
credibility increases gradually from 1 percent to 100 percent. 
Few employers have enough exposure for their experience to 
be considered 100 percent credible. If an employer had a 
credibility factor of 20 percent and experience period losses 
equal to half the insurer's expectations, instead of cutting the 
class premium in half the insurer would reduce the class 
premium (20 percent) (50 percent) or 10 percent. If the ex 
perience period losses had been twice the insurer's loss expec 
tation, instead of doubling the premium the insurer would 
increase the class premium (20 percent) (100 percent) or 20 
percent.
Workers'Compensation Rates 213
The net effect of experience rating is that the employer 
pays a rate that is in effect a weighted average of two rates. 
The first of these two rates is one based on his or her own 
loss experience during the experience period adjusted to 
reflect what these payments would have been under the cur 
rent workers' compensation law. The second is the ap 
propriate class rate. The first rate is weighted by the 
employer's credibility factor, the second by one minus that 
same factor. For example, if the credibility factor is 20 per 
cent, the rate based on the employer's experience is .50, and 
the class rate is 1.00, the experience rate will be (20 percent) 
(.50)+ (80 percent) (1.00) = .90. The higher the credibility 
factor the less the experience rate will depend upon the class 
rate.
Schedule Rating
In many states many insurers have in recent years in 
troduced schedule rating plans. Under these plans insurers 
usually decrease the rate the employer would otherwise pay 
through credits based on a subjective evaluation of such fac 
tors as the employer's loss control program.
Retrospective Rating
Retrospective rating bases the employer's premium on the 
employer's loss experience during the policy period, subject 
to the condition that the premium cannot be less than a 
stated minimum nor higher than a stated maximum. Between 
the minimum and maximum limits the retrospective 
premium is equal to the losses the employer incurs during the 
policy period plus the expenses that are related to the losses 
incurred and a basic premium. The basic premium covers the 
expenses that do not vary with the losses incurred and a net 
insurance charge. The insurer imposes a net insurance charge 
because in the aggregate the insurer loses more dollars
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(because of the maximum premium limitation) than it gains 
from those who pay the minimum premium. Retrospective 
rating permits quasi-self-insurance. In most cases the 
premium depends upon the employer's own loss experience, 
but the insurer administers the program and the premium is 
bounded by the minimum and maximum premiums. Because 
the basic premium is a function of the experience premium, 
it is affected by any change in the class premium in the same 
manner as the experience premium. For the most part, 
however, an employer's retrospective premium does not de 
pend upon its class rates.
A version of retrospective rating that has become popular 
in many states in recent years is paid-loss retro. Instead of 
paying a deposit premium in advance, subject to later ad 
justments as more information on payrolls and losses 
becomes available, the insured pays the retrospective 
premium in annual installments. Each year's installment is 
the benefits and expenses paid that year because of accidents 
that occurred during the policy period. The insured may 
prefer this approach because (1) the insured retains the use 
of the premium dollars longer and (2) the premium paid 
never depends upon the insurer's estimate of future 
payments. However, the insurer may increase its charges 
because it loses some of the investment income it would 
otherwise make. A related practice that affects more in- 
sureds than paid-loss retro plans waives the requirement that 
employers with a premium of at least $2,500 pay in advance 
a full deposit premium.
Dividends
Many workers' compensation insurers return dividends to 
their policyholders. These dividends may vary among firms 
depending upon their size and their individual loss ex 
perience.
Workers' Compensation Rates 215
How Insurers Determine Their Class Rates
In order to understand how insurers determine the class 
rates in the rating manual, one must know the elements of a 
class rate. A class rate includes allowances for (1) expected 
losses, (2) the expenses the insurer expects to incur in servic 
ing the insured, and (3) a profit for the insurer or a margin 
for policyholder dividends.
The expected loss allowance is the amount the insurer ex 
pects to pay in benefits per $100 of payroll to all insured 
employees in the same industry during the period the rate is 
in effect. The principal reasons the insurer may change this 
allowance are that it expects changes in (1) the frequency and 
severity of job-related injuries or diseases, (2) the propensity 
of employees to claim benefits for their injuries or diseases, 
(3) the workers' compensation law, or (4) the cost of settling 
claims because of such economic factors as rising or falling 
wage levels or medical costs. The expected loss allowance, 
therefore, is based on expectations for the future that are 
subject to considerable error. In establishing these expecta 
tions, the insurer analyzes its experience in the recent past, 
modified to reflect changes that it expects to occur during the 
future because of law changes and trends in claim frequency 
and severity. Even if the law will remain the same and there 
are no changes in claim frequency or severity, the past ex 
perience may suggest that the current rates be increased or 
decreased. The current rates may be inadequate or excessive 
because the insurers or the regulators either underestimated 
or overestimated the insurer's needs when they established 
those rates, or because the rates have been in effect for some 
time and conditions have changed.
The expense allowance is expressed as a percent of the 
rate. Some of these expenses, such as commissions, are 
budgeted and paid as a percent of the rate. Others, such as 
general administrative expenses, are not budgeted, but on
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the basis of past experience and future trends the insurer can 
determine what proportion of the rate it will use for this pur 
pose.
The prof it or profit and contingency allowance is also ex 
pressed as a percent of the rate. As will be explained later, 
the profit allowance in most states is 2.5 percent. Conse 
quently if the insurer's expected loss and expense allowances 
exactly matched actual losses and expenses, the insurers 
would have earned an underwriting profit equal to 2.5 per 
cent of the class premiums written. Because these expecta 
tions are almost never realized exactly, the actual under 
writing profit rate may be more or less than 2.5 percent. In 
surers argue that this 2.5 percent profit rate plus the invest 
ment income generated by writing workers' compensation 
insurance would produce a reasonable profit on net worth.
If the expense allowance were set at 32.5 percent of the 
rate and the profit allowance at 2.5 percent, the remainder of 
the rate, 65 percent, would be available to pay losses. If the 
dollar amount required to pay losses was determined to be 




Workers' compensation rates are regulated in a variety of 
ways. Except for Texas, where a state board makes the rates, 
states are commonly grouped into two general categories: 
(1) rating bureau—prior approval states and (2) open- 
competition states. In rating bureau—prior approval states, 
the largest category at the present time, rating bureaus are 
permitted to develop and file rates in behalf of their 
members and subscribers. Membership in the rating bureau 
may be compulsory or optional. Agreements to adhere to
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these rates may or may not be permitted; where such 
agreements are permitted, members and subscribers may or 
may not be permitted to deviate from these rates. All of these 
states require the insurance commissioner to approve 
workers' compensation rates before they can be used.
Open-competition states may or may not permit rating 
bureaus, renamed data service organizations, to publish ad 
visory rates. All, however, make membership in the 
organization optional, and prohibit agreements to adhere to 
these rates. All require insurers to file their rates with the 
state insurance department, but none have a prior approval 
requirement. Insurers, however, may be unable to use filed 
rates until after they have been on file for a designated 
period of time. The six open-competition states at present 
are Arkansas, Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan, Oregon, and 
Rhode Island. Georgia and Minnesota have also enacted 
open-competition laws that soon will become effective.
As this discussion indicates, a two-way classification of 
states (other than Texas) oversimplifies the situation. Within 
each of these two categories some significant differences ex 
ist. Table 1 shows for each of the 45 states in which private 
insurers operate (1) the role that rating bureaus are permit 
ted to play in rate determinations and (2) whether the state 
insurance commissioner must approve proposed bureau or 
individual insurer rates before they go into effect.
Role of Rating Bureaus
As of early 1983, every state except Kentucky, Michigan, 
Oregon, and Texas permits rating bureaus either to develop 
advisory rates or make rate filings in behalf of their 
members. Kentucky, Michigan and Oregon permit rating 
bureaus to develop only advisory "pure" premiums 
(premiums without expense or profit loadings). In Texas the 
State Board of Insurance makes the rates. Only 10 of these
Table 1 
Types of Workers' Compensation Insurance Rate Regulation, by State, Early 1983
Rating bureaus
Bureau rate filings 





































































































































































































































































































SOURCE: Derived from information supplied by the American Insurance Association and the National Council on Compensation Insurance. 8
C/3
a. Unless above rates approved by the commissioner. *£.
b. Effective January 1, 1984 Georgia will substitute an open competition rating law for its present approach. Bureaus will be permitted to §
publish advisory rates. *&
c. Effective July 1, 1983 Minnesota will enter a transition period that will lead to full open competition by January 1, 1986. After that date the S-
bureau will not even be permitted to publish advisory pure premiums. It will be able to publish aggregated loss data, trend factors, and loss °° 
development factors. Prior approval will continue with respect to upward deviations from these pure premiums until July 1, 1986 when it will
cease completely. (In late May 1983 Minnesota advanced the beginning of complete open competition to January 1, 1984.) ^
d. Advisory pure premiums only. so
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43 jurisdictions (Arizona, California, Idaho, Indiana,Min- 
nesota, Montana, New Jersey, North Carolina, Penn 
sylvania, and Wisconsin) require all workers' compensation 
insurers to belong to a rating organization, but the practice 
in most other states is for most, if not all, insurers to become 
bureau members. Although bureau membership is not re 
quired in most states, all but 14 of the 43 states that permit 
bureau rate filings (Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Rhode 
Island, and Virginia) permit bureaus to require adherence to 
the bureau rates. In these states that prohibit such adherence 
agreements, however, most insurers have until recently 
elected to use the bureau rates. Among the 29 states that per 
mit agreements to adhere to bureau rates all but seven states 
(California, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, North 
Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin) permit insurers 
either (1) to deviate from the bureau rates after securing the 
insurance commissioner's approval or (2) a much less com 
mon option, to charge lower rates without securing any prior 
approval. Such deviations seldom occurred in the past except 
for specialized classes for which some insurers may have 
developed some special expertise or associations. They have 
become more common in recent years through the filing of 
deviations from class rates or of scheduled rating plans. Only 
five states require all insurers to belong to a rating bureau, 
permit agreements to adhere to the bureau rates, and pro 
hibit deviations from these rates.
In most states the National Council on Compensation In 
surance is the rating organization. The exceptions are as 
follows:
Workers' Compensation Insurance Rating Bureau
of California 
Delaware Compensation Rating Bureau
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Hawaii Insurance Rating Bureau
Indiana Compensation Rating Bureau (administered
by the National Council on Compensation Insurance) 
Workers' Compensation Rating and Inspection Bureau
of Massachusetts 
Workers' Compensation Rating and Inspection
Association of Michigan 
Workers' Compensation Insurers' Rating Association
of Minnesota 
New Jersey Compensation Rating and Inspection
Bureau
New York Compensation Insurance Rating Board 
North Carolina Rate Bureau 
Pennsylvania Compensation Rating Bureau 
Virginia Compensation Rating Bureau 
Wisconsin Compensation Rating Bureau
The National Council provides many of these independent 
rating bureaus with statistical services.
All states with independent rating bureaus except Indiana, 
Minnesota, and Virginia permit these bureaus to require 
adherence to their rates. Of the seven states that prohibit 
deviations from agreements to adhere to bureau rates, all but 
Missouri are states with independent rating bureaus.
Georgia and Minnesota will soon become open- 
competition states. In Georgia insurers will be permitted to 
develop advisory rates. In Minnesota rating bureaus will at 
first be permitted to develop advisory pure premiums, but 
starting in 1986 (changed to 1984 in late May 1983) they can 
publish only actual loss costs plus loss development and 
trend information.
Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York are all rating 
bureau-prior approval states. However, Connecticut does 
not require insurers to belong to the bureau and forbids
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agreements to adhere to the bureau rates. New Jersey re 
quires insurers to belong to its independent bureau, permits 
agreements to adhere to the bureau rates, and prohibits 
deviations from those rates. New York does not require in 
surers to belong to its independent bureau, but it permits 
agreements to adhere to bureau rates. However, deviations 
from the bureau rates are permitted. Connecticut and New 
Jersey, but not New York, permit insurers to waive the ad 
vance payment of a full deposit premium.
Prior Approval Requirements
As table 1 shows, all states, except the six open- 
competition states, require insurers to file their proposed 
rates and wait until the state insurance commissioner ap 
proves them. Usually the commissioner must act within a 
stated period after the rates are filed. If he or she fails to act 
within that period, the insurer can use the rates.
In two open-competition states (Arkansas and Oregon) an 
insurer cannot use rates until they have been on file for a 
designated period. In the other states, insurers are permitted 
either to use the rates and then file them or to file their rates 
and use them immediately.
Georgia and Minnesota will soon become open- 
competition states. Georgia will not require prior approval; 
Minnesota will require approval only of upward deviations 
from the bureau advisory pure premiums until 1986 (chang 
ed to 1984 in late May 1983) after which time insurers will be 
able to use their rates immediately and file them later. Con 
necticut, New Jersey, and New York are all prior approval 
states.
Important Regulatory Issues
Three regulatory issues that have been the subject of in 
tense debate in recent years are (1) open competition versus
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the rating bureau-prior approval approach, (2) the effect of 
insurers' investment income on the profit loading in their 
rates, and (3) the excess profits approach as a supplement to 
either open competition or prior approval.
Open Competition Versus Rating 
Bureau-Prior Approval Approach
Traditionally workers' compensation insurance rates have 
been more restrictively regulated than other property and 
liability insurance rates. Although a few states have erased or 
reduced these differences, workers' compensation rates con 
tinue in most states to be more rigidly controlled. For exam 
ple, 21 states are generally considered to be open- 
competition states with respect to property and liability in 
surance. Only six states (soon to be eight states) have open- 
competition workers' compensation laws. However, several 
other states have considered such legislation in recent years. 
The arguments advanced in the legislative debates on this 
issue are summarized in the next two sections.
Arguments Favoring Open-Competition Laws
Those who favor open-competition laws argue that the 
rating bureau-prior approval approach stifles or discourages 
price and service competition. In the early days of workers' 
compensation, this approach made sense because only a few 
states had insolvency funds that would protect employers 
and injured workers against insurers who became insolvent 
because of competitive pricing pressures or undercapitaliza 
tion. Furthermore, few insurers had developed enough ex 
perience or expertise to establish their own prices. Today 
such guarantee funds exist in every state; insurers are now 
more highly capitalized and better managed, and many in 
surers, with the aid of data advisory organizations, can 
establish their own rates with confidence.
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A prior approval requirement, in their opinion, is a 
misguided, inefficient use of regulatory resources. Insurers 
are subjected to costly delays, decisions that are influenced 
too often by political pressures instead of objective evalua 
tions, and in some states expensive hearings. Regulators are 
required to make decisions that would frustrate Solomon 
and are better left to the marketplace. Consumers lose 
because insurance availability problems arise when insurers 
believe the approved rate structure is inadequate, and 
because for some insureds the approved price exceeds the 
competitive price.
Rating bureaus by definition set an average price that is 
too high for some insurers, too low for others. The expense 
allowances included in the rates are typically based on the 
average expense experience of nondividend paying stock in 
surers, which tend to have higher expenses than the other 
groups of insurers. Without rating bureaus or prior approval 
requirements, they argue, insurers will compete more 
vigorously for business. Both price competition and service 
competition will intensify, producing better services and 
lower prices. Much of the service competition will consist of 
improved loss control advice and assistance and more effec 
tive claims management, both of which will reduce claims 
costs. Price competition will cause the premiums to be lower 
on average and more responsive to the loss experience of 
groups of insureds with similar exposures and of individual 
insureds. Groups of similar insureds and individual insureds 
will in turn have more incentive to better their own perfor 
mances in controlling losses and managing claims. Admit 
tedly, some intense price and service competition does exist 
under the rating bureau-prior approval approach, but ac 
cording to open-competition supporters, this competition 
benefits almost exclusively larger employers who might 
otherwise self-insure.
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Open-competition laws will also force insurers to make 
more independent decisions regarding workers' compensa 
tion insurance instead of delegating so much of this decision- 
making to the rating organization. Currently, insurers tend 
to assign their most able employees to other lines involving 
more decisions. Open-competition laws will cause more of 
these employees to become concerned about workers' com 
pensation problems; the result will be some innovative ap 
proaches.
Finally, open-competition advocates argue, in those states 
where open competition has been tried price competion has 
been intense, no serious insolvency problems have 
developed, insurer services have not suffered, and insurance 
has become more readily available through standard chan 
nels.
Arguments Against Open-Competition Laws
The opponents of open-competition laws argue with equal 
intensity that it would be a serious mistake for most states 
with rating bureau-prior approval laws to move to open 
competition. Workers' compensation insurance, they argue, 
is different. Workers' compensation insurance is social in 
surance. With a few exceptions, workers' compensation is 
the exclusive recourse of the employee against the employer. 
The benefits, prescribed by statute, are to be paid on a no- 
fault basis. Unless employers secure permission to self-insure 
their financial obligations under this statute, they must pur 
chase workers' compensation insurance. Consequently, the 
public is much more concerned about the solvency of 
workers' compensation insurers and how they establish their 
prices than in the solvency and pricing practices of other in 
surers. Consequently the public is best served by (1) a pricing 
mechanism that permits a rating bureau to apply its expertise 
to the pooled experience of many insurers and promotes rate
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stability and (2) prior approval which involves the regulator 
more actively in the pricing process.
These opponents deny that permitting rating bureaus to 
exist and requiring prior approval stifles price and service 
competition as much as the open-competition advocates 
claim. In the typical prior approval state, competition takes 
many forms. Insurers need not belong to the rating bureau; 
they may develop their own rates. The bureau is permitted to 
require members to adhere to its rates, but the members may 
secure insurance department approval to deviate from these 
rates. Schedule rating plans that permit such deviations on 
the basis of subjective evaluations have become much more 
commonplace. Dividends provide another avenue for price 
competition. Prior approval, they agree, could be a problem 
if rigidly and unfairly administered, but they believe this is 
not the case in most states. The trend is toward more flex 
ibility and reliance on market forces. Furthermore, price 
competition is not the only kind of competition that is possi 
ble. Under prior approval, insurers have even more incentive 
to compete on the basis of services rendered.
The second line of thought pursued by the opponents of 
open competition is that this approach will itself produce 
some adverse effects. For many insureds, especially small 
employers, prices will rise in the short run and probably the 
long run. Price competition may become so intense that the 
solvency of many insurers and the viability of guarantee 
funds may be threatened. Small insurers especially will be 
adversely affected by the inability of the rating bureau to 
develop rates to which they can simply agree to adhere. 
Because smaller insurers may be less able to compete effec 
tively under open competition, the market may soon be con 
trolled by a few large insurers; this growing concentration 
would weaken the degree of effective competition. The pro 
ponents of open competition, they assert, have greatly
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underestimated the quality of the insurer and rating 
organization personnel who are currently involved in 
workers' compensation insurance. The rating practices, loss 
control services, and claims management services match in 
quality those associated with any other line of insurance.
Probably the most serious concern of open-competition 
opponents is that the data base used to calculate workers' 
compensation rates will be less reliable. Unless all insurers 
use the same rate classes, or subclasses that can be combined 
into a uniform set of rate classes, their experience cannot be 
pooled to establish a credible yardstick for measuring the 
fairness of the class rates. Open-competition laws are likely 
to generate heterogeneous classifications that will substan 
tially reduce the volume of experience that can be mean 
ingfully pooled.
In any event, these opponents say, it is too early to 
evaluate experience under the open-competition laws in 
force. None of these laws has been in effect for more than a 
few years. Even if one leans toward the concept of open 
competition it is better to liberalize the administration of a 
prior approval state and to "wait and see."
Some opponents of open-competition laws simply deny 
that price competition in workers' compensation insurance is 
effective enough to justify such heavy reliance on the 
marketplace. These opponents are much more opposed to 
removal of the prior approval requirement than to pro 
hibiting rating bureaus.
A Brief History: 1980-83
The trend toward open-competition workers' compensa 
tion laws was stimulated by the adoption in December 1980 
by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners of 
a model open-competition rating law. This model bill, which 
was considered to be a regulatory alternative for those states
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favoring the open-competition approach to rate regulation, 
dealt with most types of property and liability insurance, but 
one of its most controversial parts was the section on 
workers' compensation insurance rates. For two years rating 
organizations could publish advisory rates, but insurers 
would not be required to join the organization and would be 
prohibited from agreeing to adhere to the advisory rates. In 
surers would have to file new rates before they used them, 
but these rates would not be subject to prior approval. After 
two years workers' compensation insurance rates would be 
treated like most other property and liability insurance rates. 
Rating organizations could develop only advisory pure 
premiums. Insurers could use new rates before filing them.
In December 1982, in response to some objections to the 
December 1980 model bill treatment of workers' compensa 
tion insurance rates, the NAIC adopted a separate and dif 
ferent model open-competition workers' compensation act. 
Under this bill, data service organizations can develop only 
advisory pure premium rates. A major provision requires in 
surers to report their loss experience under a uniform 
statistical plan approved by the state insurance commis 
sioner.
During 1982 at least eight states debated vigorously but 
did not act on open-competition workers' compensation 
statutes. Fewer states have thus far seriously considered this 
possibility. This slowing down has been attributed primarily 
to the development of, and more liberal regulatory response 
to, scheduled rating plans and other deviations from bureau 
rates, but some observers believe the real cause is a "wait 
and see" attitude. 4
Investment Income and Insurance Rates
Employers and others have expressed intense interest in re 
cent years in whether workers' compensation insurers have
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adequately recognized in their pricing the investment income 
they generate from writing workers' compensation in 
surance. This section will describe (1) why insurers generate 
investment income from writing workers' compensation in 
surance and (2) how this investment income is recognized in 
the profit loading in class rates.
How Insurers Generate Investment Income 
From Insurance Writings
Insurers generate some investment income from their 
writings in all lines of insurance because some time elapses 
between the dates when the insurer collects its premiums and 
the dates when it pays some of its expenses and most of its 
claims. For some lines of insurance, such as fire insurance 
and automobile physical damage insurance, the time lag is 
short and the investment income generated during this 
period on the monies held by the insurer is relatively small. 
For other lines of insurance such as automobile liability in 
surance and workers' compensation insurance, the time that 
elapses is long and the investment income generated by the 
insurer relatively large. For example, according to the most 
recent rate filing by the Workers' Compensation Insurers 
Rating Association of Minnesota, on the average only 22.5 
percent of the total dollar claims is paid by the time the in- 
sured's policy expires, 58.5 percent five years after the policy 
period starts, 77.8 percent ten years later, and 92.9 percent 
20 years later. 5
The Profit Loading in Manual Rates
Insurers have for many years recognized investment in 
come in their pricing of workers' compensation insurance. 
Whether they have adequately recognized such income and 
whether they should do so explicitly is the real issue. In most 
states insurers include a 2.5 percent profit loading in their 
class rates which, if their predictions are correct, will pro 
duce an underwriting profit equal to 2.5 percent of the
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premiums earned. If an insurer's workers' compensation 
premiums are three times the net worth the insurer allocates 
toward writing workers' compensation insurance, the 2.5 
percent profit loading will produce a 7.5 percent under 
writing profit on net worth. 6 Therefore, the insurer's total 
return on net worth because of its workers' compensation 
writings would be 7.5 percent plus its investment income ex 
pressed as a percent of net worth.
The underwriting profit loading has not always been 2.5 
percent. In 1915 the national underwriting profit loading was 
0 percent. The loading was raised to 1.5 percent in 1917 but 
dropped again to 0 percent in 1920. Despite underwriting 
losses insurers did not try to increase this 0 percent profit 
loading again until 1934. According to C. A. Kulp, insurers 
did not seek a higher profit loading during this period 
because (1) workers' compensation insurance was a favorite 
wedge or business-getter for more profitable lines and 
(2) workers' compensation time lags provided substantial 
funds for investments. 7 Other considerations were the threat 
of state funds and the social insurance characteristics of 
workers' compensation. In the early thirties, however, in 
vestment income disappeared or turned into losses and 
underwriting experience worsened. In 1934 the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners approved a profit 
loading of 0 percent to 5 percent, depending upon how the 
insurers' cumulative losses in the state since 1933 compared 
with the portion of the premiums collected since 1933 that 
was supposed to cover these losses. If the cumulative loss 
payments equaled the cumulative loss allowances in the 
rates, the approved profit loading was to be 2.5 percent. If 
the cumulative payments exceeded the cumulative loss 
allowances, the profit loading could be more than 2.5 per 
cent but not more than 5 percent. If the payments were less 
than the allowance, the loading could be less than 2.5 percent 
but not less than 0 percent. Because underwriting experience
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improved markedly during the next few years, during the 
forties the loading under this rule soon became 0 percent for 
all but a few states.
In 1949 the National Council on Compensation Insurance 
included a 2.5 percent profit loading in its rates, which by 
1957 had been approved in most states. One argument in 
favor of including a 2.5 percent profit loading in workers' 
compensation insurance rates was that in all other property 
and liability insurance lines the profit loading was at least 2.5 
percent. In 1951, however, a subcommittee of the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners had recommended 
that the loading be only 1.5 percent. The subcommittee 
argued that a 1.5 percent profit loading plus investment pro 
fits should provide a reasonable rate of return on net worth. 
The NAIC, however, approved a 2.5 percent profit loading.
In recent years a few states have required insurers to in 
clude a smaller profit loading than 2.5 percent because of the 
presence of investment income. For example, on April 21, 
1981 then Minnesota Commissioner of Insurance Michael 
Markman issued an order disapproving the request of the 
Workers' Compensation Insurers Rating Association of 
Minnesota for an average 28.6 percent increase in workers' 
compensation rates. Instead he granted an average increase 
of 11.8 percent effective June 1, 1981. 8 The principal reason 
why the Commissioner recommended a much lower increase 
than requested was because he disagreed with WCIRAM's 
2.5 percent profit loading in the proposed rates. He argued 
that if rates were increased 28.6 percent, the combined 
underwriting and investment profits of insurers would ex 
ceed 30 percent, which would be excessive. He based this 
finding on several assumptions, including a 14-year payment 
period for losses incurred during the policy year, net worth 
during those 14 years equal to one-third of the loss reserve 
established at the end of each year, and a 7 percent after-tax
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investment return on assets corresponding in amount to the 
loss reserves and associated net worth. Commissioner 
Markman argued that the reasonable rate of return was 18 
percent and that, under the assumptions noted above, in 
surers could attain this objective with a -10 percent profit 
loading in their rates. Depending on the assumptions used 
this approach may produce a profit loading above, below, or 
equal to 2.5 percent.
Only three other states have reduced the 2.5 percent profit 
loading to reflect investment income—Georgia to 2 percent, 
Massachusetts9 to -12 percent, and Oklahoma to 0 percent. 
The effect of investment income on total insurer profits has 
been cited in two or three other states as one of the reasons 
for reducing recently requested rate increases, but the profit 
loading was not explicitly reduced. In Connecticut, New 
Jersey, and New York the profit loading is 2.5 percent.
Excess Profits Statutes
Another approach to rate regulation that may supplement 
either a prior approval or an open-competition law is an ex 
cess profits statute. Six states (Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, 
Minnesota, New York, and South Carolina) have excess pro 
fits statutes applicable to automobile insurance. 10 Only one 
state, Florida, has such a statute applicable to workers' com 
pensation insurance.
Excess profits statutes require insurers to return to their 
policyholders profits in excess of a specified threshold. In 
theory the threshold is the long-run reasonable rate of return 
from all sources plus an allowance for short-run fluctuations 
around that reasonable rate of return.
The Florida statute requires workers' compensation in 
surers to return to their policyholders any underwriting pro 
fit that exceeds the profit loading in the rate by 5 percent.
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Currently, therefore, the threshold is 2.5 percent plus 5 per 
cent or 7.5 percent. Instead of applying the test to each 
year's operations, however, the statute orders the state in 
surance department to test the average underwriting profit 
over the past three years. Investment income does not affect 
the allowance for short-run fluctuations, but the department 
is supposed to consider investment income in approving the 
basic profit loading.
Excess profits statutes first appeared on the scene during 
the early seventies when several states passed automobile no- 
fault statutes and a gasoline shortage existed. Both of these 
events were expected to reduce insurance costs, but opinions 
differed widely on the extent of those reductions. Excess pro 
fits statutes were passed to protect consumers against large 
insurer windfall profits. Florida's workers' compensation 
statute had a similar stimulus—the conversion of permanent 
partial disability benefits to a wage loss benefit. Insurance 
costs were expected to decrease because of this change with 
the possibility of large windfall profits for insurers.
Excess profits may make open-competition statutes more 
acceptable because insureds have some protection against ex 
cess insurer profits. For the same reasons regulators might be 
able to also administer prior approval statutes more flexibly. 
On the other hand, excess profits will occasionally require in 
surers to return profits to their policyholders even if their 
long-run rate of return is equal to or even less than the 
reasonable rate of return. Furthermore, determining the ex 
cess profit threshold is a difficult process involving several 
highly subjective assumptions. 11
None of the three regional states has an excess profits 
statute applicable to workers' compensation insurance. New 
York, however, is one of only two states, the other being 
Florida, that has implemented such a statute applicable to 
automobile insurance.
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Concluding Remarks
Workers' compensation insurance rate determination and 
regulation vary widely among the states. A trend exists 
toward more reliance on competition through the passage of 
open-competition laws or, more commonly, through more 
flexible administration of rules permitting class rate devia 
tions and schedule rating. A few prior approval states have 
reduced the 2.5 percent profit loading in the rates to reflect 
insurers' investment income. Open-competition states expect 
competition to reduce insurers' total profits. One state has 
an excess profits statute.
The three states represented here illustrate this diversity. 
All are rating bureau-prior approval states. All authorize a 
2.5 percent underwriting profit loading. In Connecticut 
membership in the rating bureau is optional and rate 
adherence agreements are prohibited. New Jersey, on the 
other hand, forbids deviations from the rates developed by 
its rating bureau to which all insurers must belong. New 
York is much closer to Connecticut than to New Jersey in its 
rate regulation, but is somewhat less flexible. Both Connec 
ticut and New York have seriously considered open- 
competition laws. New Jersey has not. New York is one of 
two states in the nation to implement an excess profits law 
applicable to automobile insurance.
Strong arguments exist pro and con for each of these ap 
proaches. The opportunity to experiment is supposed to be 
one of the advantages of state regulation as opposed to 
federal regulation. The laboratories testing ways of deter 
mining and regulating workers' compensation insurance 
rates have probably never been more active.
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NOTES
1. The National Council on Compensation Insurance periodically 
publishes a listing of state standard premium rates.
2. Employers whose class premium would otherwise be under some small 
amount, such as $500, have to pay an extra charge called an expense con 
stant because the expense allowance in the rate does not produce enough 
dollars to cover the expenses incurred in servicing these very small in- 
sureds.
3. The rating formula used in practice is more complicated than the one 
described here. The results, however, are close to those described above.
4. "Drive for Open Competition Rating Starting to Slow Officials," 
Business Insurance, February 21, 1983, pp. 2, 74. "Trend to Open Com 
petition Rating Slows," Journal of Commerce (March 11, 1983), p. 7A.
5. Exhibit A - Derivation of Overall Average Premium Level Change 
(Minneapolis: Workers' Compensation Insurance Rating Association of 
Minnesota, 1982), Exhibit B-I, p. 39.
6. No generally accepted method exists for determining what portion of 
an insurer's net worth is devoted to writing a single line of insurance. In 
deed, some persons argue that an insurer's net worth cannot be appor 
tioned among lines of insurance; each $1 of net worth is available if need 
ed for all lines of insurance written.
7. C. A. Kulp, Casualty Insurance, 3rd ed. (New York: The Ronald 
Press, 1956), p. 151.
8. For more details, see the original order and C. A. Williams, Jr., 
"Minnesota Employers' Workers' Compensation Costs: The Short-Run 
and the Long-Run," Risk Management and Insurance Issues, No. 1, 
School of Management, University of Minnesota, January 1982.
9. The Massachusetts -12 percent profit loading, which became effective 
January 1, 1983, is currently being contested before a court. Investment 
income was the major reason for a negative profit loading but no single 
formula was used to derive -12 percent.
10. For an analysis of these statutes see C. A. Williams, Jr., "Regulating 
Property and Liability Insurance Rates Through Excess Profits 
Statutes," The Journal of Risk and Insurance 50, 3 (September 1983).
11. For additional arguments for and against such statutes see Ibid.
